

# RESPONSE TO THE TOTTENHAM RIOTS

HOT DEBRIEF REPORT



EMERGENCY PLANNING AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY TEAM

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RIOTS

- 1.1.1 On Friday 5<sup>th</sup> August it was announced that Mark Duggan, a well-known local man with connections to Broadwater Farm had been shot dead by fire-arms officers on Ferry Lane. An Independent Police Complaints Commission investigation was launched.
- 1.1.2 A protest march to Tottenham Police Station took place on Saturday afternoon, and continued into the early evening.
- 1.1.3 The protest later transformed into a major public order disturbance, with damage caused to very many properties on the High Road between Monument Way and Northumberland Park.
- 1.1.4 Rioting and looting became widespread in the borough, particularly in Wood Green and Tottenham Hale.
- 1.1.5 Over subsequent days, rioting and looting spread to neighbouring boroughs, across London and then finally to many towns and cities in England.
- 1.1.6 Despite the national character of the event overall, Tottenham was the starting point. It also appears to be the case that on many dimensions, the impact in Haringey was greater than anywhere else.
- 1.1.7 It is also true to say that unlike elsewhere, no one in Haringey lost their life. However, residents fled their homes in fear of their lives. The lack of fatalities is probably a matter of luck.

## 1.2 IMPACT

- 1.2.1 The impact of the riots was significant. This report does not attempt to catalogue the impact fully, but the following issues are very relevant
  - Very widespread damage and looting of businesses
  - Many people displaced from their homes

- Closure of roads for a week or more
- Loss of power, and disruption to telecommunications
- Destruction of buildings and homes
- Psychological impacts on people – both residents and business owners
- Disruption to the local economy
- Loss of confidence, particularly in Tottenham
- Ongoing concerns about community relations, and fears about personal safety.

### 1.3 THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSE

1.3.1 The Council has a responsibility to prepare for and to respond to emergencies. From an early stage, and throughout the following days and weeks the Council has been fully engaged in dealing with the consequences of the riot.

1.3.2 The Council undertook actions in many areas including:

- Providing for the welfare needs of affected people
- Giving support to the emergency services, especially the police
- Maintaining the provision of key services located on the High Road
- Coordinating work to clean up and reopen the High Road
- Providing support to businesses
- Developing a longer-term recovery plan

### 1.4 REVIEW PROCESS

1.4.1 This has been the biggest emergency to face the borough for many years. Reviewing the events to ensure lessons are identified and acted on is extremely important.

1.4.2 The review process for the riots is multi-dimensional. It involves both an operational review for responding agencies

and partnerships, and a strategic review of the wider lessons for society and policy-makers.

1.4.3 There will also be reviews at different levels: local, regional and national.

## 1.5 PURPOSE

1.5.1 The purpose of this report is to describe initial findings from the Hot Debrief of the Council's response to the public disorder in Tottenham.

## 1.6 SCOPE

1.6.1 The report looks only at the Council's role in the response phase of the emergency. This covers Saturday 6<sup>th</sup> August to Monday 15<sup>th</sup> August.

1.6.2 There is no discussion about the possible causes for the riots, or possible policy ramifications.

1.6.3 The report will not discuss the response of other agencies, except where it is necessary to explain the actions of Council officers. No attempt will be made to evaluate the effectiveness of the responses of other agencies, except where they were working on the instruction of the Council.

1.6.4 This is an interim report, designed to highlight initial findings. A further report will be provided setting out a fuller set of conclusions.

## 1.7 METHODOLOGY

1.7.1 The debrief report draws on:

- Questionnaires completed by response officers. All officers in engaged in the response were invited to respond.
- Facilitated discussion groups among officers with key roles in the response.

## 1.8 FURTHER INFORMATION

1.8.1 Please contact Andrew Meek, Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Manager. 020 8489 1127.



Borough Emergency Control Centre

## 2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### 2.1 OVERALL

2.1.1 There appears to be an initial consensus that the Council responded well to the emergency. Of a relatively small sample of questionnaires returned by officers, all felt the Council's response was either "Good" or "Excellent").

2.1.2 This can be attributed to:

- Good general level of emergency preparedness
- A clear command and control structure that worked well
- Very high levels of commitment and effort shown widely by officers
- Members who were extremely engaged, with appropriate levels of delegated authority to officers.

2.1.3 Within that context, there are relevant lessons and areas for further considerations. Some of these are outlined below.

### 2.2 KEY AREAS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

2.2.1 Some improvements have been identified to emergency management arrangements. While different parts of the structures put in place generally worked well in their own right, more could be done to aid communication between them.

2.2.2 Communication with the public is an area where further discussion is needed. The role of social media was key in this emergency, and the Council's use of these communications tools needs further study.

2.2.3 The Community Assistance Centre was highly successful. A key role for the Council can be played in documenting and sharing this model with other authorities.

2.2.4 The Council's Business Continuity arrangements proved equal to the challenge of dealing with the simultaneous loss of three buildings on the High Road. The corporate Business

Continuity Plan was not invoked. A sobering thought is that if the same damage had occurred in Wood Green as in Tottenham, the Council would have faced a challenge on a much greater scale.



Arson at Ashley Road Depot



### 3 RECOMMENDATIONS

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** Ensure the notification of all Tier 1 and 2 officers in the event of a major incident.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** Develop a mechanism for coordinating on-call rotas across the Council.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** Review the roles in the Emergency Management Plan

**RECOMMENDATION 4:** Develop arrangements for Gold support in the Emergency Management Plan.

**RECOMMENDATION 5:** Formalise the separation of BECC Manager and Silver Controller in large scale emergencies, and consider how best to resource these roles.

**RECOMMENDATION 6:** Review the mechanisms for communication between the BECC and Gold.

**RECOMMENDATION 7:** Identify further officers to train up as potential BECC Managers.

**RECOMMENDATION 8:** Ensure the Call Centre are properly briefed to deal directly with calls from the public wherever possible.

**RECOMMENDATION 9:** Review the numbers of and support arrangements for Local Authority Liaison Officers.

**RECOMMENDATION 10:** Make provision in emergency plans for briefing of MPs and dealing with enquiries from their offices.

**RECOMMENDATION 11:** Consider how social media might be made use of to keep the public informed during emergencies.

**RECOMMENDATION 12:** Develop a Members training package.

**RECOMMENDATION 13:** Seek further feedback from Members on other areas of concern.

**RECOMMENDATION 14:** Clarify responsibilities for notifying and alerting NHS organisations.



**RECOMMENDATION 15:** Review Emergency Plans to ensure the roles of partners (e.g.Homes for Haringey), contractors and voluntary agencies are reflected.

**RECOMMENDATION 16:** Review the London Humanitarian Assistance Plan and share lessons from the Community Assistance Centre.

**RECOMMENDATION 17:** Review the Council's Business Continuity arrangements in the light of the riots.



Cleaning up the High Road

## 4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

### 4.1 ACTIVATION

- 4.1.1 Prior conversations about the risks arising from the death of Mark Duggan served to put key officers on standby. This meant that duty officers became aware of the unfolding events via the media at an early stage.
- 4.1.2 Gaining a clear picture of how serious the situation was extremely difficult. The emergency services were not able to provide any factual information until Sunday morning. All conversations were qualitative but without clear facts (e.g. “its as bad as it could be”). By Sunday morning, the Duty Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) was clear that many buildings were damaged, but did not know which ones.
- 4.1.3 However throughout this period there was good communication between Duty Gold, Duty EPO and Duty Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO).
- 4.1.4 Early mobilisation of a core officer group on Sunday was vital to the Council response. This activation was instigated purely on the qualitative assessments and media information.
- 4.1.5 The formal structures set out in the IEMM followed later.
- 4.1.6 The notification of senior officers was somewhat haphazard, beyond the core group. This was in part due to an initial paucity of information on what the impact had been, and therefore who needed to be advised. It is clear that in the initial hours of Sunday, there were lots of individual officer initiatives that were not centrally instigated, coordinated or reported.

**RECOMMENDATION 1: Ensure the notification of all Tier 1 and 2 officers in the event of a major incident.**

- 4.1.7 Officers from many services who were on call were not aware of who else was on call, or for example, who was on duty from CEMB. In future, it would be sensible to coordinate all the on-call rotas across the Council so a team of available officers can be easily identified.

**RECOMMENDATION 2: Develop a mechanism for coordinating on-call rotas across the Council.**

## 4.2 INITIAL ACTIONS

4.2.1 Throughout the evening of Saturday 6<sup>th</sup> August, and throughout the night it was extremely problematic to initiate actions given the scant information available.

4.2.2 However these actions included:

- Notifying all staff at work and discussing how to mitigate risks to health and safety
- Requesting that the Community Alarms and Emergency Response team identify and make contact with vulnerable people in the vicinity of Tottenham High Road for reassurance.
- Recommending police attendance at the CCTV control room (this suggestion was acted upon)
- Making Tottenham Green Leisure Centre (TGLC) available as a rest centre for displaced people.
- Ensuring the safety of staff and clients attending events at TGLC

4.2.3 The choice of rest centres and the support provided was based on the duty EPO's risk assessment. It was assessed as too hazardous to send staff to the affected area. Opening a rest centre further from the riot area was considered but rejected since there would be no possibility of providing transport to get residents to the rest centre. TGLC was open (hosting two parties that night) and so staff were asked to look after people making their way there. Trained volunteers supplemented that initial response from early on Sunday morning.

4.2.4 There are no further actions that have been identified that could have been taken during this initial period, or disagreement or concern with those actions taken.

### 4.3 MULTI-AGENCY COMMAND STRUCTURES

- 4.3.1 This was in part because the Council's plans assume a multi-agency command structure that the emergency services did not put in place until 1400 on Sunday at the Council's strong recommendation.
- 4.3.2 The Chief Executive, AD for Single Frontline and the Emergency Planning Manager were all diverted from managing the emergency into a "Community Gold" meeting. Although described as a Gold meeting (which should be a tightly organised meeting to take strategic control of the incident) it was in reality a community reference group meeting. This had the impact of diverting key officers away from dealing with the emergency, and delayed the Council's response in a number of areas.
- 4.3.3 This, added to the fact that there were operational Gold meetings taking place at London level with no local authority input is a key concern.
- 4.3.4 At the Emergency Planning Manager's strong recommendation, a Silver Command group was established on Sunday afternoon, led by the Police, with input from the LFB, TFL and others. This subsequently managed the restoration of the High Road.

### 4.4 COUNCIL STRUCTURES

- 4.4.1 Regular Gold meetings, and the establishment of the Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC), and the role of the Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) in linking to the emergency services worked very well. These were put in place on Monday.
- 4.4.2 There was significant divergence between some of the roles set out in the Emergency Management Plan and what happened in practice. These require a thorough review.

**RECOMMENDATION 3: Review the roles in the Emergency Management Plan**

## 4.5 COUNCIL GOLD MEETINGS

- 4.5.1 The Council Gold Team worked really well and decisions were actively made, however these were not always communicated quickly and clearly to the BECC and CAC.
- 4.5.2 An officer was provided to support the Gold team, a function that is not in the IEMM and was extremely useful in ensuring that the meetings were accurately recorded. This function should be factored into the IEMM. The scope of the support needed by a Gold team needs to be considered.
- 4.5.3 The need for the Gold team to meet twice daily for a week was not clearly anticipated in writing the plan. Gold team members felt that the time spent in meetings became onerous, and that a leaner approach would have been helpful.

**RECOMMENDATION 4: Develop arrangements for Gold support in the Emergency Management Plan.**

## 4.6 HARINGEY GOLD AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

- 4.6.1 Throughout the emergency a member of CEMB was on duty as Gold. This is a defined role in the Emergency Plan.
- 4.6.2 This works well in ensuring a strategic decision-maker is available to represent the Council at senior level, and to maintain control of the response.
- 4.6.3 In practice, the Chief Executive retained overall control, insofar as this was reasonably practicable and as long as it was felt necessary. This would be the reasonable expectation of the Leader and other senior stakeholders. There were many calls for the Chief Executive from the offices of government ministers, commencing at an early stage.
- 4.6.4 It is not felt that this arrangement was overly problematic, as there was good communication between the Chief Executive and Duty Gold throughout. It is felt this arrangement was beneficial in sharing responsibilities and pressures.

## 4.7 HARINGEY SILVER

- 4.7.1 The Emergency Planning Manager acted as “Haringey Silver”. This role eventually split out from the BECC Manager role, as the demands became overwhelming.
- 4.7.2 In part the demands on the “Haringey Silver” were partly due to a succession of Gold meetings (Council, partnership and Community etc). There were also very many queries and requests for advice that came from officers at all levels.
- 4.7.3 A review of how this role can work in a way that would avoid over-reliance on key individuals is needed.
- 4.7.4 However the formal division of responsibilities between BECC Manager and Silver seems sensible for very large incidents.

**RECOMMENDATION 5: Formalise the separation of BECC Manager and Silver Controller in large scale emergencies, and consider how best to resource these roles.**

## 4.8 BOROUGH EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

- 4.8.1 The BECC was activated on Monday 8<sup>th</sup> August through til Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> August and was open Monday – Friday, 0900 to 1700. Outside of these hours, emergency calls went to Vangent.
- 4.8.2 The BECC worked well in coordinating the efforts of the Council’s response and the use of the Atlas Incident Management System (AIMS) was invaluable in being able to keep track of all the actions and information flowing through the BECC.
- 4.8.3 However, there is a need to review the communication structures between the BECC and the Gold meeting and the BECC and those on the ground as this flow of information was not always apparent. This may have delayed actions being completed.

**RECOMMENDATION 6: Review the mechanisms for communication between the BECC and Gold.**

4.8.4 The inclusion of all directorates worked within the BECC as per the Emergency Plan, but the management of the BECC needs to be reviewed as in the plan this falls to the Emergency Planning Team and this was not the case for this incident. This may result in the need for additional people to be trained to fulfil the role of BECC Manager.

**RECOMMENDATION 7: Identify further officers to train up as potential BECC Managers.**

4.8.5 There seemed to be a lot of calls coming into the BECC that could have been actioned by the Customer Call Centre. This should be reviewed for the future in ensuring that Customer Services are fully briefed in order to answer those queries presented by the public.

**RECOMMENDATION 8: Ensure the Call Centre are properly briefed to deal directly with calls from the public wherever possible.**

4.8.6 It has been suggested that a single control centre shared by partners would be beneficial. Throughout the weeks following the riots the emergency services responses were centrally led and directed, with local control significantly constrained.

4.8.7 At a London level the Strategic Coordination Centre, which would have provided a multi-agency command and control structure was not activated. The reasons for this have not yet been set out clearly.

4.8.8 The benefits of a shared borough level control centre will be discussed as part of the multi-agency debrief to be conducted by the Haringey Emergency Planning Partnership.

#### **4.9 LOCAL AUTHORITY LIAISON OFFICERS (LALO)**

4.9.1 Of the six designated LALOs, four officers provided 24 hour cover and attendance at meetings over the course of a week.

4.9.2 One of the six was on annual leave, and another was fully committed dealing with Housing issues. This officer is already expected to cease LALO duties, as Housing is no longer part of Urban Environment / Place and Sustainability.

4.9.3 A review of the numbers of LALOs is required.



4.9.4 Support arrangements for LALO also need to be reviewed.

4.9.5 Arrangements need to be considered for remote working for the LALOs, e.g. the use of a laptop whilst on call. The LALOs were unable to access AIMS which would have assisted them with their role.

**RECOMMENDATION 9: Review the numbers of and support arrangements for Local Authority Liaison Officers.**

#### 4.10 ROLE OF ELECTED MEMBERS

4.10.1 The Leader and Cabinet Members provided support and feedback, managed the political aspects of the emergency, and communicated confidence in and appreciation of officers' actions.

4.10.2 Many Members did invaluable work, volunteering at the CAC and in community outreach. This is an unforeseen extension of the role of Members in the Emergency Plan.

4.10.3 A general principle of emergency management is to ensure the operational independence of officers to respond. There is no reason to believe that this principle was put in jeopardy, even when Members became "responders" by volunteering.

4.10.4 The positive relationship with Members meant officers were able to act within their delegated authority, knowing that Members understood and appreciated what was being done.

4.10.5 David Lammy MP and his office played a significant role in the aftermath of the riots. Further thought is needed about managing the demand for information from MPs. The relationships between MPs and Council officers is less close, and less well-practiced.

**RECOMMENDATION 10: Make provision in emergency plans for briefing of MPs and dealing with enquiries from their offices.**

4.10.6 The borough was visited by the Prime Minister, several Ministers, the Mayor of London and the Prince of Wales and Duchess of Cornwall. These visits helped highlight the concerns of the borough.

## 5 WARNING, INFORMING AND ALERTING

### 5.1 WARNING THE PUBLIC

5.1.1 The Council did not initiate actions to alert the public of the disorder. Warning arrangements work on a “lead responder” principle. In the case of civil disorder, the lead agency is the MPS. Furthermore, it was assumed that those needing to know, would already be aware. There would also have been a serious difficulty in framing a message to the public in the absence of clear information from the emergency services

### 5.2 PROVISION OF ONGOING INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC

5.2.1 Nevertheless from an early stage there was a need to have a clear message for the public.

5.2.2 The Council later provided periodic updates on the website, to the media and to Members. The interest from the media was intense and unrelenting, particularly as the Community Assistance Centre became a visible and tangible expression of the response/

5.2.3 The Council has collected the mobile phone numbers of 20,000 members of the public for communication in emergencies. This was not used.

5.2.4 In view of the central role of social media in the disorder and the subsequent community efforts to respond, there is scope to reconsider how the Council might have used social networks, social media etc to communicate with the public.

**RECOMMENDATION 11: Consider how social media might be made use of to keep the public informed during emergencies.**

5.2.5 The importance of face-to-face communication via the Community Assistance Centre, and related outreach programmes for reassurance should not be underestimated.

5.2.6 The BECC took more calls from the public than was anticipated in the emergency plan. A review of the interaction between the BECC and the Contact Centre is required.

5.2.7 There was a natural emphasis on Tottenham, but there was significant damage done elsewhere. Wood Green was particularly affected. It was important maintain a borough-wide perspective on the emergency. Proactive outreach by Councillors and officers to traders in Wood Green helped significantly in this regard.

### 5.3 PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO STAFF

5.3.1 Staff feedback has shown that as a whole they felt well informed as to what was happening once the briefings were being provided, although it has been suggested that these could have been initiated earlier.

5.3.2 The staff briefings made available via Harinet were well received and were informative and helpful in understanding how the situation was progressing.

### 5.4 PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO MEMBERS

5.4.1 Members were kept informed via written briefings provided by Communications, and by two cross-party briefings. All briefings on actions taken were corporate, rather than service or directorate based.

5.4.2 Initial perceptions were that these were useful in keeping Members informed and advised.

5.4.3 Some officers have reported a large number of calls coming from (non Cabinet) Members asking officers to carry out tasks in response to the incident. These were often a useful means for officers to become aware of the concerns of residents. On some occasions requests were also suggestions for actions that were not judged to be appropriate, and others were requests for actions that were already in hand.

5.4.4 Any request of this kind potentially presents a dilemma for officers. The priority is always to deliver the best outcome for residents, and in an emergency this takes precedent over providing feedback to Members. Officers might be within their rights to treat the formal response as per any other Members Enquiry, which would manage the demand for

information, but is also likely leave Members understandably anxious about the lack of immediate assurance.

5.4.5 Awareness training for Members about how the Council plans for and responds to an emergency may help to increase Members confidence in the Councils response, while managing expectations about feedback on individual cases.

**RECOMMENDATION 12: Develop a Members training package.**

5.4.6 Further feedback should be sought from Members to highlight any further areas of concern.

**RECOMMENDATION 13: Seek further feedback from Members on other areas of concern.**

## 5.5 INFORMING AND MOBILISING PARTNERS

5.5.1 Partners became quickly aware of the incident, and where needed were mobilised.

5.5.2 Linkages between the Council and NHS organisations needs further exploration to ensure that this works effectively.

**RECOMMENDATION 14: Clarify responsibilities for notifying and alerting NHS organisations.**

5.5.3 A review of the role of Homes for Haringey in the emergency plan is suggested. Home for Haringey played a particularly crucial role throughout the response.

5.5.4 A significant part of the Council's response was delivered through contractors, and/or with the support of the voluntary sector.

**RECOMMENDATION 15: Review Emergency Plans to ensure the roles of partners (e.g. Homes for Haringey), contractors and voluntary agencies are reflected.**

## 6 WELFARE

### 6.1 REST CENTRE

6.1.1 The Council was forced into an informal rest centre provision during the initial riot period, as it was assessed as too dangerous to mobilise the normal rest centre team until Sunday morning.

6.1.2 The Rest Centre at Tottenham Green Leisure Centre was open throughout Sunday. It reopened again on Monday.

6.1.3 Actual numbers of people attending the rest centre was relatively small. In general, their immediate concerns were about finding somewhere to stay.

### 6.2 HOMELESSNESS SERVICE

6.2.1 The Homelessness service at Apex House became overwhelmed on Monday. The pressure was relieved by establishing the Community Assistance Centre on Tuesday.

### 6.3 COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE CENTRE

6.3.1 From the establishment of a task group to achieve this, and the CAC opening was just half a day. This was an outstanding achievement.

6.3.2 The Community Assistance Centre became a hub not just for direct assistance to the community, but also

- volunteering efforts
- donations
- community outreach
- business continuity of affected services (especially Job Centre Plus)

6.3.3 There is no doubt about the positive contribution played by the CAC, not just for those immediately affected, but also:

- Giving a focus for more positive messages about Tottenham

- Allowing people to feel involved

6.3.4 Staff working within the CAC have said how humbled they felt to be able to offer direct assistance to those affected and received very positive feedback from those visiting the centre, either as donators or those affected.

6.3.5 There is a need to review the London Humanitarian Assistance Plan in light of the CAC to ensure that all the lessons identified are captured and addressed within this regional plan.

**RECOMMENDATION 16: Review the London Humanitarian Assistance Plan and share lessons from the CAC.**



Community Assistance Centre

## 7 BUSINESS CONTINUITY

- 7.1.1 Business Continuity arrangements were needed for three key buildings (476, 639, and 684 High Road).
- 7.1.2 The initial strategy for the Youth Offending Service to relocate to the Civic Centre turned out to not be viable. An alternative strategy was developed thereafter, making use of space at the Professional Development Centre.
- 7.1.3 Mental Health Services were quickly relocated to the Clarendon Centre, according to their local business continuity plan.
- 7.1.4 Planning, Regeneration and Economy were relocated to River Park House. This was initially problematic while officers assessed how quickly 639 High Road would be unavailable. Once it was clear that the building would be out of commission for some time, it was relatively straightforward to identify sufficient space for the whole service.
- 7.1.5 Building Control and Regeneration both played crucial roles in the response to the incident, and did so despite the Business Continuity issues faced by the service as a whole.
- 7.1.6 Homes for Haringey staff were also relocated from 639 High Road to other HFH offices.
- 7.1.7 The work from particularly Facilities and IT to enable services to be re-established was outstanding. Feedback from service managers has been very positive.
- 7.1.8 Some concerns remain about the numbers of staff gaining access to unsafe premises. Greater control of access needs to be asserted in these circumstances.
- 7.1.9 Pembury Children's Centre was also closed in the week following the riots. Children's Services supported the Children's Centre in relocating their services on a temporary basis.
- 7.1.10 These business continuity issues were dealt with under local business continuity plans. The coordination of



corporate support services would have been enhanced through activation of the Corporate Business Continuity Plan, to ensure structures were put in place to manage this support.

7.1.11 It is concerning to consider what the impact on the Council would have been in the event that the bulk of the damage had been in Wood Green, affecting River Park House and other key Council buildings.

**RECOMMENDATION 17: Review the Council's Business Continuity arrangements in the light of the riots.**



Damage to 639 High Road

## 8 RECOVERY MANAGEMENT

### 8.1 RECOVERY MANAGEMENT CELL

8.1.1 The Recovery Management Cell was established and met on Wednesday 9<sup>th</sup> August.

8.1.2 A discussion was had about preparing for the longer term effort to recover from the riots, and the timing of the handover.

8.1.3 A useful set of criteria from the London Recovery Management Framework were used to evaluate how soon the handover might take place.

8.1.4 A structure for dealing with recovery issues was set out, namely:

- An Infrastructure, Business and Economic Recovery Group
- Health and Welfare Group
- Community Panel.

8.1.5 These structures have been retained through the ongoing recovery.

### 8.2 HANDOVER PROCESS AND TIMING

8.2.1 The Operational Gold meeting on Saturday 13<sup>th</sup> August confirmed that the handover to recovery could take place.

8.2.2 The first Recovery Management Group met on Monday 15<sup>th</sup> August.

8.2.3 No issues have been identified with the handover process. The timing of the handover appears appropriate.

### 8.3 EVALUATION OF RECOVERY PHASE

8.3.1 Recovery will be a long-term process. Therefore there is no attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of recovery in this report.

## 9 CONCLUSIONS

### 9.1 IMPACT OF THE RIOTS

- 9.1.1 There is little doubt that the riots have had a very serious impact on the borough, and on Tottenham in particular.
- 9.1.2 It is also clear that it is too early to state with confidence what the longer-term consequences will be.
- 9.1.3 However, the immediate needs of people and businesses were substantial, and required a response across the range of Council services.

### 9.2 HARINGEY COUNCIL'S RESPONSE

- 9.2.1 There appears to be an initial consensus that the Council responded well to the emergency. This can be attributed to:
- Good general level of emergency preparedness
  - A clear command and control structure that worked well
  - Very high levels of commitment and effort shown widely by officers
  - Members who were extremely engaged, with appropriate levels of delegated authority to officers.
- 9.2.2 Within that context, there are many relevant lessons and areas for further considerations.